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ABSTRACT: Musicality is central to musical processes and music research. Yet, there is no consensus 
of what is understood by the term. It can be assumed that in large populations musicality is distributed 
according to a bell curve — just as any trait of personality. It is also clear that musical skills can be 
improved, regardless of a possible stigma of unmusicality. Depending on the conception of musicality, 
musicality research confronts issues and trade-offs relating to ecological validity of the concept (how 
musicality connects to actual music), methodology (which methods of study yield valid and reliable 
results), epistemology (how the gain knowledge of musicality), and ontology of music (what processes 
pertain to music, what not, and what is possible shared). These issues are reflected in the primarily 
psychological theories and tests of musicality.
This article makes an attempt at a Peircean analysis of musicality. It has been suggested that the 
traditional psychometric approach to musicality is followed by a semiotic approach, and assuming 
musicality has to do with how subjects make sense in musical processes, the semiotic analysis of mu­
sicality is critical. This analysis applies Peirce’s notion of thought-sign and his tenfold classification of 
the sign (suggesting a three-dimensional exemplification of Peirce’s trichotomous, three-dimensional 
model). The ten classes are differentiated by six transitions, that seem to have their correlates in the 
psychological understanding of cognition: manifestation, definition, filtering, binding, associating and 
understanding of the sign.
The six transitions appear useful in analyzing the concept of musicality. Correspondingly, the condi­
tions for musical signification extend from ability of auditory sensation to those of dynamical memory, 
auditory filtering, auditory structuring, association sound objects and ability to understand and manage 
communicational situations in music. In order to understand musicality, all these aspects should be 
studied with good ecological and methodological validity in mind.
KEYWORDS: musicality, musical ability, musical semiotics, Peirce, sign, thought-sign, music psy­
chology
She is quite young: 17, and pretty; really it was a joy to guide her little fingers. But 
joking apart, she has a lot of real musical feeling; one did not have to say: crescen­
do here, piano there; now quicker, now slower, and so on. I could not refuse to send 
them my polonaise in F minor, which captivated Princess Eliza; so please send it to
me by the first post...
1. Introduction
Chopin’s description of princess Eliza Radziwiłł illustrates salient fea­
tures of musicality:1 it is a quality that a person more or less possesses, it can be 
felt (without reasoning), it is communicated in action (without verbal language), 
it tends to commit, even compel those around — it is at the core of professional 
and amateur music-making. The concept of musicality is ubiquitous in musician’s 
thinking, conscious or not, as well in thinking of those teaching, researching or 
simply listening to music.
Yet now, after about one hundred years of research in the field, there still is 
no clear consensus of what is understood by the term “musicality”. Consequently, 
we tend to be stranded with dictionaiy-like definitions unable to truly illuminate 
the concept, or with avoidance of the concept altogether. Adding notions such as 
musical talent, musical intelligence, musical competence, aptitude, ability and 
achievement, or those of artistry, creativity and musicianship, we end up with 
quite a hodgepodge for a conceptual apparatus.2
Typically in lay theory, imprinted by a Kantian-Goethean-Beethovenian ge­
nius cult, a person either is innately musical (preferably a child prodigy), or not, 
and there is not much that can be done about it. This would be a good excuse for 
not making an effort for musical growth, paralleling the same in mathematics, 
foreign languages, sports, etc. Yet, it can be assumed that in large populations 
musicality is distributed according to a bell curve — just as any personality trait 
or feature: length, intelligence, ability to concentrate, or what not. There are many 
people who are moderately musical, and less of those who are extremely musical 
or extremely unmusical. It is also clear, that through rehearsing and studying, 
musical skills can be improved to the point that the stigma of unmusicality, often 
considered absolute and immutable, is shaken off, especially if motivated, guided 
by a proficient instructor, and supported socially.3
1 Fr. Chopin’s letter to Tytus Wojciechowski, 14 Nov. 1829, Frédéric Chopin, Chopin’s 
letters, with the assistance of Henryk Opienski, and E. L. Voynich (New York: Dover, 1988), 74.
2 Please note, that I am here referring to musicality as a form of predisposition, mental 
capacity, prospective or manifested cognitive skills relating to music, rather than as an identity, 
part of self, particularly the professional self or profile (cf. “musicianship” in English).
3 See e.g. Adrian C. North and David J. Hargreaves, The Social and Applied Psychology 
of Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51-60 for the impact of environment and 
motivation on development of musical skills, and Ava Numminen, Laulutaidottomasta kehit- 
tyvaksi laulajaksi: Tutkimus aikuisen laulutaidon lukoistaja niiden avaamisesta, Studia musica
25 (Helsinki: Sibelius Academy, 2005), [Helping adult poor pitch singers learn to sing in tune: 
A study of stumbling blocks confronting developing singers and means of surmounting them], 
whose “results show that a disability to sing is not a fixed trait of an individual but a skill which 
can be developed in adult years from any initial level” — the study found no correlation between 
the developing ability to sing with good pitch and a musicality test (ibid., 6). See also Isabelle 
Peretz, “Brain specialization for music: New evidence from congenital amusia,” in The Cognitive
Hence, from the viewpoint of music education, the easier a person adjusts 
existing or acquires new habits of perception, thinking and action pertaining to 
listening, performing, composing or other ways of being involved with music, the 
more musical he or she is. When musicians talk of a highly musical musician, they 
refer holistically to the quality of music-making, music-related communication 
skills, sense of situation and shape, innovativeness, and, yes, creativity (whatever 
that entails), freshness, richness and keenness of expression, even charisma. This 
understanding of musicality reflects the artistic practices, experiencing and the 
related emotions. Consequently, musicality in this sense may be difficult to observe 
by an outsider, and is therefore difficult or even impossible to describe qualitatively, 
let alone to measure quantitatively.
2. Musicality research in music psychology
Musicality being an issue of mental capacity, it has been studied par­
ticularly in the field of music psychology. The empirical research tradition has 
stressed the need to be able to measure what is measurable, and to make meas­
urable what is not. Consequently, the fact, that it is easier to measure readily 
observable abilities rather than emotions or needs, creativity or expression, has 
had an impact on the ruling conception of musicality in psychological research 
of musicality. Furthermore, ontology going hand in hand with epistemology and 
methodology, the different currents of psychology have each left a mark on how 
musicality is understood and how it is studied. Hence the scientific notions of 
musicality have varied e.g. from Carl Seashore’s structuralist to James L. Mursell’s 
Gestalt-psychological notion, and from Robert Lundin’s behavioristic notion to 
John Blacking’s anthropological and Kai Karma’s cognitivist notions of musicali­
ty.4 Within this complex of conceptions of musicality Kai Karma5 identified three, 
closely related aspects: 1) the sensory versus holistic character of musicality; 2) the 
explanatory power of the concept versus its homogeneity and 3) musicality as 
pertaining exclusively to music vs. as a more general ability.
Neuroscience of Music, ed. Isabelle Peretz and Robert J. Zatorre (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 192-203., for a lead-in to the still on-going discussion on amusia versus 
acquisition of musical skills.
4 Kai Karma, “Musikaalisuus” in Musiikkipsykologia, ed. Jukka Louhivuori and Suvi Saa- 
rikallio (Jyvaskyla: Atena Kustannus Oy, 2010), 355-68; Musicality, 355-356; see also Jere T. 
Humphreys, “Precursors of Musical Aptitude Testing: From the Greeks through the Work of 
Francis Galton "Journal o f Research in Music Education 41, no. 4 (1993), doi:10.2307/3345507., 
Jere T. Humphreys, “Musical Aptitude Testing: From James McKeen Cattell to Carl Emil Seasho­
re”, Research Studies in Music Education 10, no. 1 (1998), doi:10.1177/1321103X9801000104.; 
Heiner Gembris, “Historical phases in the definition of musicality,” Psychomusicology: A Journal 
of Research in Music Cognition, no. 16 (1997).
5 Karma, “Musikaalisuus,” 355-68.
Some conceptions hold that musicality is determined by or structured on the 
sensory abilities, such as those of pitch or timbre discrimination. This kind of 
sensory abilities are relatively easy to measure, and tests based on this view, such 
as the atomistic musicality tests by Carl Seashore of musicality, are sometimes 
still used — for just that: for measuring the abilities to discriminate e.g. pitch or 
rhythm. However, the sensory abilities are no longer regarded as a guarantee 
for musical abilities and their development, and the tests of musicality that rely 
on sensory discrimination tasks are usually considered more or less alienated or 
detached from the actual music: they are not considered “ecologically valid”.6 In 
other words, the sensory abilities do not seem to have sufficient explanatory power 
over musical skills.
In contrast to the sensory conceptions of musicality, the conceptions of mu­
sicality in the tradition of Gestalt psychology opted for examining musicality in 
terms of phenomena present in actual music: melodies, chords, keys, rhythms, 
etc., even their esthetic values. The abilities to discriminate, perceive or oper­
ate with these may, again, be measurable to a degree. Nevertheless, also this 
approach is problematic, since the musical features operated upon are specific 
to certain music culture of a certain era (in this case usually classical Western 
tonal music).7
Consequently, we face a two-fold question. First, is it possible to reach a concep­
tion (or even a theory) of musicality that would explain the actual skills involved in 
musical processes across music cultures, and yet would be accessible to scientific 
and empirical research? The ensuing problem is that, according to Karma (2010, 
362), “[I]f musicality is, what is required for musical thinking, listening, and mak­
ing, it consists of almost the whole person. Music-making involves motivation, 
motor abilities, intelligence, personality etc.” As a result, we end up with a hetero­
geneous collection of abilities, that are again difficult to measure, and that pertain 
to many aspects of life, also much beyond music.
Second, this leads to the question of whether musicality is something that per­
tains exclusively to music or whether it shares some cognitive processes with other 
aspects of our lives. Some correlations have been found between musicality and, 
e.g., general, verbal and spatial intelligence. At the same time, neuropsychological 
studies suggest, supported by “compelling” evidence (such as case studies with 
subjects with amusia without language deficits and vice versa) that “music might
6 Steven M. Demorest, “Issues of ecological validity for perceptual research in music,” Psy­
chomusicology: A Journal of Research in Music Cognition, no. 14 (1995)., Kai Karma, “Musical 
aptitude definition and measure validation: Ecological validity can endanger the construct validity 
of musical aptitude tests,” Psychomusicology: A Journal o f Research in Music Cognition 19, 
no. 2 (2007), doi:10.1037/h0094033.
7 Karma, “Musikaalisuus,” 355-68; at 358-60.
well be distinct from other cognitive functions, in being subserved by specialized 
neural networks”.8
If musicality is understood broadly as extending to all aspects of musical pro­
cesses, examining and measuring it would require examining and measuring much 
of the whole personality, which may be much too big a task. Should musicality 
then be limited to those aspects of personality specific and exclusive to music, 
further problems arise: which aspects are indeed specific and exclusive to music, 
and what ramifications would exclusion of aspects non-specific to music have on 
the conception and research of musicality?
A compromise to this has been advocated by Kai Karma who has defined mu­
sical aptitude or musical ability (sic! versus musicality) as the ability to structure 
acoustic material, the ability to ’conceive auditory patterns, i.e. sets of relations 
between tones”.9 This way musical ability becomes analogous to spatial ability in 
that it exists as a general ability, which may develop into various specific forms 
or expressions, pending on the music culture, resembling the development of 
technical and mechanical abilities based on spatial ability. In this approach, the 
limitations of the atomistic sensory approach and the problems of transcultural 
differences between subjects are avoided, while maintaining the possibility for 
rigorous music-psychological study of the phenomenon, and enabling objective 
measurement of the untrained potential, as developed by Karma.10
The study of musicality has emphasized the cognitive measurements in musical 
processes, and rightly so, assuming we want to adhere to the psychometric prin­
ciples of being able to measure subject’s musicality in purely psychological terms. 
However, since musicality appears to be a property of both music and the subject 
involved in music, it might also be advisable to examine the interplay between the 
subject and music, and to study how music is experienced and how it is made to 
be experienced, i.e. the process of musical signification.
In fact, Heiner Gembris11 has advocated an essentially semiotic approach to 
musicality as the third historical phase, following what he has considered the initial
8 Isabelle Peretz, “Brain specialization for music: New evidence from congenital amusia,” 
in The Cognitive Neuroscience o f Music, ed. Isabelle Peretz and Robert J. Zatorre (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 192-203. See also Aniruddh D. Patel, “Why would Musical 
Training Benefit the Neural Encoding of Speech? The OPERA Hypothesis,” Frontiers in Psycho­
logy 2 (2011), doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00142. for a suggested hypothesis for a neurophysiological 
consolidation of distinct versus shared processing.
9 Kai Karma, “Musical Aptitude as the Ability to Structure Acoustic Material,” International 
Journal o f Music Education 3, no. 1 (1984), doi:10.1177/025576148400300104„ 28.
10 Ibid., Kai Karma, “Components of Auditive Structuring — Towards a Theory of Musical 
Aptitude,” Bulletin o f the Council fo r  Research in Music Education, no. 82 (1985)., Karma, “Mu­
sical aptitude definition and measure validation: Ecological validity can endanger the construct 
validity of musical aptitude tests”, Karma, “Musikaalisuus,”, 355-68.
11 Heiner Gembris, “Historical phases in the definition of musicality,” Psychomusicology: 
A Journal of Research in Music Cognition, no. 16 (1997).
phenomenological approach, and the second psychometric approach to musicality 
(extending from Seashore 1919 to Gordon 1989). Objecting to the relatively poor 
validity of the psychometric tests of musicality, among other issues, Gembris has 
emphasized that “generation of meaning is at the core of musicality”,12 and found 
support to this from John Sloboda’s definition of musical ability as “the ability to 
make sense of music”, John Blacking’s definition of musical intelligence as the 
“cognitive and affective equipment of the brain with which people make musical 
sense of the world”, and Gino Stefani’s definition of musical competence as “the 
ability to produce sense through music”.
Gembris has defined musicality as “the ability to generate musical meaning”,13 
and called for a line of research that would map the plethora of the manifestations 
of musical abilities across the differentiated musical styles, whether in lis ten ing, 
composing, or producing, in order to derive a descriptive inventory for those abili­
ties, i.e. for musicality.
This, of course, brings musicality research again in closer contact with actual 
musical processes, and with all likelihood improves the ecological validity of the 
research. Also, it again brings up the problem of homogeneity of the concept and 
the problem of generality versus specificity of the processes involved in music. 
Hence it seems that a synthesis between what e.g. Gembris is after and the vast 
amount of psychological research pursued in the issues relating to musicality might 
benefit from a semiotic analysis of the notion of musicality.
3. The Peircean framework: the thought-sign and 
the tenfold classification of the sign
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the 
objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole 
of your conception of the object.14
provides a method or conceptual analysis as “[t]he method prescribed in the maxim 
is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, — that is,
12 Ibid., 20.
13 Ibid.
14 Charles S. Peirce, Collected papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce, editor Arthur W. Burks, 
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce VII-VIII (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press), 1931-1958; Charles S. Peirce, Collected papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce, editors Charles 
Hartshorne, and Paul Weiss I-VI (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1931-1958. 
References to the Collected Papers (abbreviated CP) are conventionally designated by volume 
number and paragraph number. CP 5.438, italics original.
the consequences for deliberate, self-controlled conduct”.15 The pragmatic maxim 
is the third grade of clarity, according to Peirce,16 the first being mere “familiarity 
with a notion” and the second “the defining of it”.17 Some aspects of the conceiv­
able practical consequences of the concept of musicality to the research on it have 
already become apparent above. If the conception is too narrow, it leaves out 
important parts of musical processes, whether crosscultural diversity of musical 
abilities or issues of sensory psychophysiology. In contrast, a broad conception 
has an inherent trade-off: the broader the concept, the better ecological validity 
can be assumed, but at the cost of losing the homogeneity of the concept resulting 
in a conglomeration of the objects of study, which would require a) exceptional 
conceptional and methodological clarity, and b) joined efforts across disciplines of 
research. Regarding the depth of the concept, the concept of musicality is clearly 
inseparable from that of music, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article.18 ^
Let us now briefly go through how thought-signs develop, based on Peirce’s 
notion of thought-signs and his tenfold classification of the sign, for the benefit of 
then matching the concept of musicality with the model of the sign.
According to Peirce, “thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of 
representation”,19 and in Peirce’s days representamens with “a cognition of a mind” 
as Interprétant were “the only representamens that have been much studied,20 in 
contrast to contemporary achievements of, say, biosemiotics or artificial intel­
ligence. Consequently, Peirce’s semiotics is largely about thought-signs, although 
these form a special case of signs. Peirce described thought-signs as follows:
Whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, con­
ception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it follows from our own 
existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything 
which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not pre­
vent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once 
a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, 
as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign has, as such, three references: 
first, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object 
to which in that thought it is equivalent; third, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, 
which brings it into connection with its object.21
15 Ibid.
16 CP 5.402.
17 CP 5.392.
18 Also see Juha Ojala, Space in Musical Semiosis: An Ahductive Theory o f the Musical 
Composition Process, Acta semiotica fennica 33 (Imatra: International Semiotics Institute at 
Imatra; Semiotic Society of Finland; Dept, of Musicology, University of Helsinki, 2009), 79-156.
19 CP 2.274.
20 CP 2.242.
21 CP 5.283.
Applying the phaneroscopic categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Third- 
ness to the concept of sign and its three references yield the tenfold tripartition of 
the sign, here treated as a thought-sign. Peirce illustrated the ten classes of Signs 
in the traditional triangles as shown in figures 1 and 2.22 The problem with these 
illustrations is that they lack in bringing forth how each of the three references 
of the sign makes up a distinct dimension in this inherently three-dimensional 
model. Unfortunately, any illustration of a three-dimensional model suffers if 
portrayed in two dimensions. A better solution might be if the ten classes were 
illustrated as a three-dimensional model. A sample projection of the three-dimen- 
sional model, with the ten classes and the six transitions therebetween labeled 
is given in figure 3.
Signs divided into Ten Classes
Figure 1
22 CP 8.376.
(I) (V) (VIII) (X)
Rhematic Rhematic Rhematic Argum ent
Iconic Iconic Symbol Symbolic
Qualisign Legisign Legisign Legisign
(II) (VI) (IX)
Rhematic Rhematic Dicent
Iconic Indexical Symbol
Sinsign Legisign Legisign
(HI) (VII)
Rhematic Dicent
Indexical Indexical
Sinsign Legisign
(IV)
Dicent
Indexical
Sinsign
Figure 2
The Sign in 
relation to its 
Interprétant
Argum ent
communicational
interpretation F: UNDERSTANDING
Dicents
unified
interpretation
Rhemes 
elements for 
interpretation
Qualisign  
possibilities of 
signification
A: MANIFESTATION
Sinsigns 
instances of 
signification
The Sign in itself
Legisigns 
laws of 
signification
The Sign in 
relation to 
its O bject
Sym bols 
object 
representation 
with associations
Indeces 
categories of factual 
object 
representation
Icons 
possibilities of 
object 
representation
Figure 3
The ten classes can be approached in terms of the six transitions that distin­
guish A) the three sinsigns from the qualisign; B) the six legisigns from the three 
sinsigns; C) the four indices from the three icons; D) the three dicents from the six 
rhemes; E) the three symbols from the four indices; and finally F) the argument 
from the three dicents, as follows.
To begin, transition A is the manifestation of the qualisign (class I) in the rhe- 
matic iconic sinsign (class II). A qualisign is a quality, a First in all respects, a mere 
possibility for representation (from the viewpoint of the semiotic subject), but 
the rhematic iconic sinsign is “an actual existent thing or event which is a sign”.23 
Second, transition B is that of defining: Sinsigns exist as particular instances, but 
the particular stands in relation to nothing, except for the qualities it embodies. 
To become significant, it needs to be compared with a relevant accumulation of 
sinsigns, a corresponding legisign, which reciprocally needs its sinsign (its replica) 
in order to signify.24 Hence, the instance of the rhematic iconic sinsign (class II) is 
paralleled by the accumulative rhematic iconic legisign (class V), and other sinsigns 
hold a similar relation to their corresponding legisigns. The law-like character of 
the legisign is pivotal, because it expands the hie et nunc of the sinsign into the 
temporally less volatile accumulation of the past and expectancy of the future, 
which is the basis of memory and learning.25
The transitions from icons to rhematic and dicent indices is a transition from 
mere possibilities present in the iconic qualities to representing the object of the 
sign as an object, endowing the thought-sign with “a real connection” between 
the index and its object.26 The filtering transition C from iconic sin- and legisign 
to indexical sin- and legisign is the semiotic counterpart of the perceptual feature 
selection process in which features useful for the represention are filtered out of 
the chaotic noise of the sensory level. Next, the binding transition D from indexical 
rhemes to indexical dicents combines the distinct, selected qualities of the rhemes, 
each carrying clues as to the object of the sign into a unified experience. At this 
point, then, the thought-sign is capable of representing the object of the sign as 
an object. But this is not enough for the object of the sign to be significant for the 
subject, since there is no “some thought which interprets” the sign: it is not more 
than a representation of the object as an object. Fully-developed signification 
requires symbols.
23 CP 2.245.
24 CP 2.246.
25 As becomes apparent, there are close parallels between the tenfold classification of the 
thought-sign and the psychological understanding of human (or other mammalian) cognition, 
but these are only hinted at in this context. See Ojala, Space in Musical Semiosis, Juha Ojala, 
“Before and after the emergence of musical thought-signs,” in Proceedings o f the 10th Interna­
tional Congress on Musical Signification, ed. Lina Navickaite-Martinelli (Vilnius: Lithuanian 
Academy of Music and Theatre, 2010).
26 See CP 5.75, CP 2.286-287.
Transition E, that of association, moves us from the Secondness of indexical 
signs (and dicents) to the Thirdness of symbols. Peirce defined symbol as “a sign 
which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of law, usually an association 
of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as refer­
ring to that Object”.27 The indexical legisigns are combined with other, associated 
legisigns of other interpreted signs (which in turn have or have had their own 
sinsigns as their instances). Thus Symbols form a mutually interconnected cluster 
of legisigns and are no longer in need of corresponding sinsigns of their own. No 
wonder Peirce stressed that the term symbol derives from the Greek “sumballein”, 
“thrown together”.28 The reason why this transition is so significant, is that through 
symbols the subject can associate any developing thought-sign with what is most 
meaningful for the subject: the signs of herself, i.e. through symbols our subjec­
tive experience is formed as objects of the signs are put in relation with ourselves 
as objects of other signs.
This takes two routes, which could be called qualitative and factual. On the 
one hand, rhematic indexical legisigns (class VI) and their unincorporated accu­
mulations of filtered features are associated with rhematic indexical legisigns into 
rhematic symbols (class VIII). These have significance even without the binding 
into dicents by accounting for such qualitative aspects of the subjective experi­
ence, that are hard to reach in terms of factual representation. I.e., the rhematic 
symbols account for the association of “feelings” in the sense that they are still 
Firsts in the relation of the sign to its interprétant. Rhematic symbols can then 
again be unified with other associated features following the principle of binding 
(dicent symbol, class IX). On the other hand, the factual aspect is established in 
the indexical dicents, representing factual objects or situations and their catego­
ries (classes TV and VII). Once these are associated with other representations of 
objects or situations, including those of the subject herself, the representation 
of the particular object in the indexical dicent turns into a dicent symbol (class 
IX), a representation of the object or situation for the subject as the associations 
are attached to the accumulation of experienced, factual situations. At this point, 
something stands for something, fo r  someone.
Finally, transition F, that of understanding, reveals the operation of the sign 
as a sign.29 The argument (class X) does not only convey the factual issues of being 
and acting in the world, or the associations with all pertinent past and present ex­
periences. It becomes a domain of reflection and of the exploration of the semiotic 
process itself. This last transition takes the sign into a semio-cognitive metalevel. 
It allows for an understanding of the semiotic process, and provides the basis for 
deliberate, purposeful communication.
27 CP 2.249.
28 CP 2.297.
29 CP 2.252.
This concludes the brief outline of how thought-signs are developed from the 
ten classes of the sign. Note, that Peirce’s examples of the ten classes in the 1903 
Syllabus, perhaps with the exception of “a feeling of red” as the example of quali- 
sign, they can all be considered examples of fully developed Signs, rather than 
different stages of developing thought-signs.30 Now, let us consider how musicality 
could be understood in terms of this model.
4. Musicality as understood in the Peircean 
framework
If ability to “make sense of music”, that is, if musical signification 
accounts for musicality, the six transitions between the ten classes of sign may 
provide a means for breaking down the conditions for musicality. This might help 
managing both the concept and research. To begin, (see transition A above), the 
qualisign must be manifested as sinsign. In terms of musical signification this 
simply means — for confirmation — that sensory abilities for sound perception 
are needed. First, musical notation is not music, but ink on paper or dark pixels 
on screen. Second, while perception in other sensory modalities does affect (or 
interfere) auditory perception, music is mediated by sound (either exclusively or 
primarily, depending on the definition). Deficiencies in hearing make it difficult to 
participate in any musical process, whether reception, performance or creation.31 
Hence, the understanding and making sense of music does require the elemen­
tary, “atomistic” abilities of auditory sensation, since they indeed are the building 
blocks for musically meaningful sound objects, regardless of musical style, genre 
or culture. These elementary abilities are a necessary but by far not a sufficient 
condition for musicality.32
For the sensory processes to be operative and well-tuned for music, there 
needs to be exposure to musical sound. Despite of his later sensory deficiency, 
even Ludwig van Beethoven had an operative auditory sense for a sufficient period
30 CP 2.254-261, 271, 253, 266-270.
31 Karma (Kai Karma, “Auditory and Visual Temporal Structuring: How Important is Sound 
to Musical Thinking?,” Psychology o f Music 22, no. 1 (1994), doi:10.1177/0305735694221002.) 
raised a question of whether musical thought processes “exist outside music”. A temporal stru­
cturing test was administered to both hearing and congenitally deaf subjects. The study showed 
that a about half of the score variance could be explained by a component common to auditory 
and visual temporal structuring, while the remaining half seemed to be modality-dependent. 
The results of the deaf subjects were quite similar to the controls, although their mean score was 
somewhat lower. Karma interpreted the results as “showing that sound is not a necessary con­
dition for musical thought processes, although it is the most effective means of communicating 
them”. Is visual temporal structuring musical thinking?
32 Hence the critique towards the atomistic theories or models of musicality seems deserved.
of time during right developmental periods to generate habits of feeling, think­
ing and action essential for music. Once these habits are formed well enough, the 
qualisign needs not necessarily originate in actual sound, but an imaginary one 
will suffice — the sinsign can be instigated through musical imagery, as is shown 
right in e.g. Beethoven’s case.
Yet, the development of the habits is not possible without the relative per­
manence of legisigns (cf. transition B). Musical signification requires that the 
perceived sounds (sinsigns) are put in relation with the relatively stable models or 
categories (legisigns) which organize them (and which can reciprocally be updated 
by individual sinsigns). Hence another requirement for musical abilities is a good 
short-term and long-term memory.33 It seems to be essential for musicality (and 
creativity) that legisigns either are constantly dynamical and updatable by sinsigns 
(cf. lifelong learning), or had the chance to develop sufficiently when possible (cf. 
neural plasticity in sensitive periods34). This again emphasizes the importance of 
exposure to a variety of musical sounds, particularly early on in life. Once the habits 
are set, it may be difficult to change them, and in music this means that it may be 
difficult or impossible to relate musical phenomena new to the subject (whether 
new in own culture, or old or new from another music culture) to accumulated 
experience. Hence Zoltán Kodaly’s coinage that music education should preferably 
begin nine months before the birth of the parent, rather than in childhood.35 In 
all likelihood, “negative learning” takes its toll here: potential ability deteriorates 
unless used and trained.
The features necessary for signification are extracted from the chaotic sensory 
stream (transition C from icons to indices above). All messages have noise, more or 
less. In music, the subject ought to be able to discern those features that are relevant 
for the musical communication and to neglect the irrelevant ones. Controlling this 
prioritizing by means other than exposure and statistical learning may be difficult, 
since what is relevant may be highly dependent on the context, in addition to often 
being largely or completely preattentive. For instance, if a slight fluctuation of pitch 
is irrelevant, it may be enough to merely categorize the pitch to, say, a1. However, 
if the fluctuation is a means of expressions by juxtaposing shades of vibrato, the 
subject should be able to pick it up, and when necessary, also to produce or use
33 Musicians have an enhanced auditory working memory, but whether the enhanced memo­
ry has been the reason they have become musicians or whether music enhances the memory, is 
not yet certain. See e.g. Karen J. Pallesen et al., “Cognitive Control in Auditory Working Memory 
Is Enhanced in Musicians,” PLoS ONE 5, no. 6 (2010), doi:10.1371/joumal.pone.0011120., Stefan 
Koelsch, Erich Schroger, and Mari Tervaniemi, “Superior pre-attentive auditory processing in 
musicians,” Neuroreport 10, no. 6 (1999).
34 E.g. Josef Rauschecker, “Functional organization and plasticity of auditory cortex,” in 
The cognitive neuroscience of music, ed. Isabelle Peretz and Robert J. Zatorre (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 357-65.
35 Mihaly Ittzes, “Zoltán Kodaly 1882-1967: Honorary President of ISME1964-1967,” In­
ternational Journal of Music Education 22, no. 2 (2004), doi:10.1177/0255761404044015., 137.
in own music-making. This kind of training is what enculturation and acquisition 
of styles, and hence learning musics are largely about. Hence the third aspect of 
musicality is this kind of auditory filtering system, which needs to be maintained 
and developed in interaction with the environment.36
This extraction process is a part of auditory structuring: selection and prepara­
tion of the building blocks for sound objects. The fourth aspect of musicality is the 
transition from rhemes to dicents (transition D), the core of the psychometric ap­
proach to musicality, the actual auditory structuring or integration of the selected 
acoustic features into a musically meaningful, (temporally and spatially) coherent 
sound image or sound object, which can be a part of the musical message or narration. 
This entails phenomena such as motifs or themes that operate either as background­
ing reference or narratively more foregrounding characters that may encounter other 
characters or backgrounds.37 Without putting sound objects together and relating 
them with one another, it may be impossible for the subject to understand the logic 
of musical events and situations. Hence, the core of the psychometric approach to 
musicality, that of auditory structuring is an important condition for musicality.
Going beyond the traditional psychological core of musicality, a further require­
ment for musical signification comes from the transition from indices of sound 
objects to musical symbols (transition E). Note the emergence of the word musical 
at this point: musical symbols are here understood as the relations between the 
sound objects and their references, associations in the experience of the subject. The 
sound objects are not interpreted as emanating from their actual sources as with 
sounds of everyday life, but are freely thrown together with other experiences, other 
legisigns, as is befitting for the subject (the mechanisms for which is another issue). 
Particularly important in terms of musicality is the ability to connect the habits of 
perceiving characteristics of sound and unified sound objects with perceived fea­
tures and the totality of the subject’s self, i.e. how the sound and its features relate 
to subjective experience, yielding the emotional effects that music has. Hence music 
constructs and reconstructs imaginary or real experiences and thereby has an effect 
on us, our emotions and experiences, and the ability of this associative construc­
tion is an important aspect of musicality, albeit apparently very difficult to study.
Last but not least, the sixth aspect of musicality is connected with the transi­
tion F from dicents to the argument, and is essentially the ability to understand 
the communicational situations in music. In music, virtual situations are com­
municated from subject to another (or to subject herself, in autocommunication).
36 Cf. Mari Tervaniemi et al., “Pitch discrimination accuracy in musicians vs nonmusicians: 
an event-related potential and behavioral study,” Experimental Brain Research 161, no. 1 (2005), 
doi:10.1007/s00221-004-2044-5.
37 Cf. Eero Tarasti, “Signs as acts and events: An essay on musical situations,” in Musical 
Signification, Between Rhetoric and Pragmatics: Proceedings of the 5th International Congress 
on Musical Signification, ed. Gino Stefani, Eero Tarasti and Luca Marconi (Bologna: International 
Semiotics Institute & CLUEB, 1998), 39-62.
When listening to music, we expose ourselves to the musical situations in order 
to create changes in or reinforce existing habits of feeling, thinking, and action. 
This may suffice for reception, but as far as musicality of performance or creation 
is concerned, the ability to control the musical praxis and poiesis is also required: 
the ability to do and make it right in order to create the wanted experience in the 
listener. Apparently this is at least partly an empathetic ability, in the sense that 
ability to predict and assess the effects music might have on others requires un­
derstanding of how people other than self might experience the communication. 
No wonder it has been shown that creative musical abilities are associated even 
with genes known to modulate social cognition and behavior.38
5. Conclusions
*
Based on the above, the core of the psychometric approach to musi­
cality, that of auditory structuring is but a part of the aspects of musicality. This 
article delineated six aspects, based on the six transitions between Peirce’s tenfold 
classification of the sign: a) ability of auditory sensation; b) dynamical memory; 
c) auditory filtering; d) auditory structuring a.k.a. integration of auditory features 
into sound objects; e) ability to associate sound objects and features thereof with 
other objects and features, particularly those of oneself; and f) ability to under­
stand and manage communicational situations in music. It seems that delimiting 
research of musicality only to one aspect is not warranted, even if it has made 
sense in terms of efficient methodology and clear conceptual apparatus. Musicality 
should be approached on its own terms, and each of the aspects should be studied 
with good validity as a goal.
The trade-off is indeed in that with this kind of holistic approach, musicality 
cannot be studied within one discipline and its methods. Efforts needs to be made 
towards improving and expanding the methods used, based on a valid ontology 
and epistemology of musicality. This calls for and interdisciplinary approach be­
tween semiotics and psychology of music, music analysis, sociocultural research 
on music, and even genetics. It seems musicality should be approached on terms 
of music, rather than having researchers decide as to the ecological validity of the 
research, regardless of the musical practices.
This signifying nature of music and holistic notion of musicality is not only 
a challenge. In fact, this is potentially what makes studying musicality and musical 
signification very interesting and rewarding: since musical signification involves 
the mind in its entirety, through studying musical signification one learns a great 
deal of not only of music, but of signification, our mind and lives.
38 The AVPR1A haplotype, see Liisa T. Ukkola et al., “Musical Aptitude Is Associated with 
AVPRIA-Haplotypes,” PLoS ONE 4, no. 5 (2009), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005534.
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